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1.
Consider the color-blind man who believes 
that fire engines are red.  Such a man can 
believe this, and even know it, but, typically, 
if not always, there will be something defec-
tive about his belief.  He won’t quite know 
what it is he believes, because he won’t quite 
know what red is.  I want to suggest that 
there’s a parallel between him and the man 
who is told that Joseph Dzhugashvili was a 
Georgian and believes it, but knows no more 
about him than that.  The latter’s belief is, in 
the familiar phrase, about Dzhugashvili de 
dicto, but not de re; in other words, he be-
lieves that Dzhugashvili was a Georgian, but 
doesn’t believe of Dzhugashvili that he was 
a Georgian; in yet other words, he isn’t as-
cribing a property directly to Dzhugashvili, 
whom he’s unable to think about directly and 
doesn’t know, but only believes that, who-
ever he may have been, he was Georgian. 
Likewise the former’s belief is about the 
color red de dicto, not de re; he is not ascrib-
ing the property of being red itself, which he 
has no way to think about, to fire engines, 
but only believes that, whatever that prop-
erty may be, fire engines have it.  In the latter 
case it isn’t safe to substitute other names for 
the same man into the belief context, and it 
doesn’t follow from the fact that a man be-
lieves that Joseph Dzhugashvili was a Geor-
gian that he must believe that Joseph Stalin 
was a Georgian.  Likewise, in the former 
case, the fact that the color-blind man be-
lieves that fire engines are red, doesn’t mean 
he believes that they are flame-colored.    
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their fecundity.  
Keywords: Privation, Misology, Irrationalism, Immoralism, 
Antinomianism, Realism





Philosophers of language have written about the use of subject terms de dicto (often char-
acterized as using terms without knowing what they refer to) for the better part of a century 
at least, but have paid very little attention to the use of predicate terms de dicto.  This 
relative neglect is not due to its relative unimportance (we’ll see that the topic has very 
wide-ranging ramifications,) nor, I daresay, to its relative rarity.  Doubtless, many people 
have noticed over the years that lots of other people, many of them students, are only too 
given to using predicates they don’t fully  understand, to society’s general detriment.  In 
this paper, I shall try to apply what has been learned about the former cases to our under-
standing of the latter.  This will involve some extrapolation from what is explicitly said 
in the relevant literature, and the drawing of morals from more than one paper at a time. 
For example, the pragmatic phenomenon of speaker’s reference (Kripke, 1977 fl.) will be 
applied to show how one may have something in mind de re even under a description that 
doesn’t apply to it.  This may be a new moral, but it’s also a rather obvious one.  Once one 
admits Donnellan’s (1966) case of a man referring to a man drinking sparkling water with 
the phrase “The man drinking champagne” because he doesn’t know what’s in the glass, 
it follows immediately that he can think of him under that description, as is clear from the 
rest of the paper.  
In most of the rest of this section, after mentioning some problems facing my account, I’ll 
argue against such accounts of seeming ignorance of the references of predicates as are in 
the literature.  In Section II, I intend to explore the nature of the de dicto/de re distinction 
and its applications.  I’ll introduce a new account of the distinction, discuss a number of 
cases in the literature that the distinction plausibly applies to, and undertake to show how 
my new account can deal with those cases, and how it might further apply to more such 
cases involving properties.  I hope to show that it has flexibility other accounts don’t, but 
not so as seriously to vitiate its philosophical merits.  In Section III, I intend to use the 
resources I’ve developed in Section II to address some classic philosophical problems. 
I’ll try to show how applying the distinction to predicates might cast light on many other 
issues.  
Although the scope of my inquiries will be broad, I’d like to remain modest in my claims 
for them.  I think the new account of the distinction is of interest, even if mostly because 
of its novelty.  I think the application of the distinction to predicates is both original, and 
satisfies clear intuitions in particular cases.  I think together they promise solutions to many 
old philosophical problems.  I hope you will find many of these things worthy of notice 
in themselves.  But, even if you aren’t impressed with particular phenomena or particular 
ideas, and want to reject all my claims, I think the facts that so many connections can 
properly be drawn among them, and that they hang together in so many ways, are worthy 
of the informed reader’s attention, if only so he can know they must all be rejected at once. 
The application of the de re/de dicto distinction to the case of color-blind people’s use of 
color terms strikes me as highly intuitive, almost obvious.  The failure to do so until now 
is probably due not to any implausibility in the thesis, but to the fact that symbolizing such 
a thing in logical terms would require that we use Second Order Logic, which is not stand-
ardly used, and which many logicians and metaphysicians are likely to resist.  Some would 
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object that Second Order Logic is incomplete, a serious flaw, and others would complain 
that it commits us to the existence of dubious entities, which are hard to understand, and 
seem impossible to refer to.  These are legitimate misgivings, but I shall not confront them 
directly.  Beyond claiming that Second Order Logic has explanatory value, I shall not argue 
for it, or attempt to address its shortcomings.  
Nor shall I directly confront another problem which I think deserves mention.  It is that 
even Second Order Logic might not be strong enough.  Many of my applications will 
involve the use of properties such as goodness and rationality, which are, in my view, 
plausibly impredicative, that is, they are properties which have themselves as properties. 
It seems to me that goodness is good, and that it’s rational to be rational.  No one has yet 
discovered a satisfactory logic for impredicative properties; we simply have no rigorous 
and adequate way to deal with them.  Having registered this objection, I shall simply by-
pass it for the rest of the paper.  The fact that we don’t have a rigorous and adequate logic 
for dealing with other issues does not keep us from using what logic we have to try to 
understand them.  The Peano Axioms are still used to aid our understanding of arithmetic, 
even though Gödel proved them incomplete, and Tarski’s semantics for formal languages 
has been exploited for insights into natural language semantics (e.g., Davidson, 1967), 
even though Tarski explicitly doubted its applicability thereto.  In like spirit, I trust we can 
use Second Order Logic to approximate what we’re trying to understand, as a way to gain 
insight into it.  
Philosophers who talk about the use of predicates which one doesn’t rightly understand 
in propositional attitude contexts have, up until now, tended to make unsystematic and 
somewhat ad hoc suggestions, when they discussed such cases at all.  Sometimes it’s been 
suggested that such usages are “ironical”, or “inverted commas” usages (like the ones a 
few words back,) in which one defers to common usage without endorsing it.  That is, cer-
tainly, one way in which a word can be de dicto, but not the only one.  A color-blind man 
can be certain that common usage of the word ‘red’ is meaningful, and endorse it, and still 
not know what it means.  On the other hand, he might have no idea of whether the word is 
commonly used or not (he might suspect it’s a neologism,) or, if so, how it is used, and yet 
use the word in formulating his beliefs.  Or he might think he knows all about redness, and 
use it perfectly seriously, and be wrong.  Other cases could probably be added.  
Another suggestion is that, in cases where the believer is ignorant of the semantics of a 
predicate used in expressing his belief, he doesn’t really believe the thing he professes to 
believe at all, since it’s nonsense to him, but only believe that the sentence he speaks is 
true.  Different responses to this bring up different important issues, so I shall spend a few 
paragraphs on it.  
Even if there are extreme cases in which your ignorance is so great that this may be the best 
way to describe the case, one you can be pretty ignorant of what you’re saying and still 
manage to believe it.  One’s assent to a form of words commits him to the proper meanings 
of the words in ways which this proposal can’t do justice to.  Consider Tyler Burge’s case 
of the man who doesn’t understand that  ‘arthritis’ refers to inflammatory diseases of the 
joints and thinks it refers to all inflammatory diseases, and thence acquires the belief that 
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he has arthritis in his thigh.  Although the facts, we may assume, fit the meaning he thinks 
the word has, he is nonetheless wrong, because the word does not mean what he believes, 
but what the doctors say.  If informed of expert usage, he could be expected to agree.  He 
is committed to the words’ proper meanings, even though he doesn’t know what they all 
are.  Yet, if the belief he express with the words ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’ were merely 
that those words expressed a truth, he would be right.  He would be using them to express 
a truth, namely that he had an inflammation in his thigh.   You could try to gloss this by 
saying his belief is actually that the sentence expresses a truth when used according to its 
standard meaning, but, remember, he doesn’t know its standard meaning, and, so, can’t 
speak of it de re.  He believes its standard meaning is its meaning in his idiolect.  His use 
of ‘standard meaning’ would have to be de dicto, and not directly about the actual standard 
meaning as such, but just about whatever the standard meaning might be.  So this attempt 
to evade making the distinction between de re and de dicto uses of predicates can only 
work if we make a distinction between de re and de dicto uses of the phrase ‘standard 
meaning’.  If this isn’t a case of applying the distinction to uses of predicates, it doesn’t 
seem much better.  
Another objection to the claim that one can’t truly believe a proposition if one doesn’t 
fully know what all the words in the sentence expressing it refer to, is that it would ob-
scure genuine distinctions.  There are many different ways of failing fully to understand 
a sentence, which have different consequences for one’s cognition and action.  Surely we 
can distinguish among people who don’t understand the sentence ‘Grass is green in the 
summertime’ because they don’t know what grass is, because they don’t know what green-
ness is, because they don’t know what summertime is, because they don’t know the first 
two, because they don’t know the last two, because they don’t know the first and last, and 
because they don’t know any of them, but, if we can’t apply the de re/de dicto distinction 
to predicates, it’s hard to see how we can account for these intuitions.  
Just to be clear, I’m not trying to account for all questionable uses of predicates with this 
distinction.  I’m well aware that people can understand their words perfectly and still say 
something wrong.  I shall have little to say about these other forms of error, but I want to 
make clear that I know the limitations of my method, and I hope to continue to be clear 
about it as I go on.  
2.
The theory of de dicto attitudes I shall be adopting is a privation theory.  De re attitudes are 
the normative ideal, and each de dicto attitude is some privation of that normative ideal.  
Although normative privation theories are philosophically venerable (they probably go 
back to Plato), they are more often found in value theory than philosophy of language.  St. 
Augustine’s privation theory of evil, in particular, holds that evil is the privation of some 
good, that is, the absence of some good that should be there.  (This view is still widely ac-
cepted.)  I hope to be able to draw on this long history both to establish the respectability 
of this general approach, and to show something of its strengths and weaknesses, to get a 
better idea of how it might apply to matters of language.  
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The greatest weakness of a privation view of evil is that it’s unexplanatory.  Traditionally, 
instances of privative concepts have not been thought to need to have anything in common. 
They were defined in terms of whatever goodness they were supposed to be privations of, 
and one privation could lack one aspect of goodness, while another something entirely dif-
ferent.  (As the old saying goes, there is no form of the bad, only a series of fallings away 
from the form of the good.)  Attempts to explain them in terms of the concept of goodness 
also tended not to get far, since goodness is primitive on this view.  It isn’t something that’s 
supposed to be explained.  It’s something that’s supposed to explain all other things.  Pla-
to’s struggles with describing the form of the Good are notorious (360 B.C., 505a-518d).  
The greatest strength of such a view is closely tied to its greatest weakness; they are two 
sides of the same coin.  That’s its versatility.  Just as it’s very hard to say in advance every-
thing that it will count as good or bad, it’s also very hard to prove after that some particu-
lar thing can’t fit the theory.  This is especially true when such a theory is applied to the 
thoughts and behavior of human beings, who are known to be finite and flawed, perhaps 
highly so.  The history of moral philosophy demonstrates this, and shows how things which 
may not seem like privations at first glance can plausibly be construed as privations.  To 
get full use of the application of the de dicto/de re distinction to predicates, I’m going to 
have to show how it applies in a wide variety of cases in an unsystematic, or seemingly 
unsystematic, manner.  I’m going to have to show that, if sufficiently confused, one can 
have de re attitudes towards something under the wrong words, or maybe no words, and 
one’s uses of a name can switch from de re to de dicto in a short space and a very volatile 
manner.  This would allow us to have attitudes towards properties de re, even when we 
didn’t de dicto, and seemingly incompatible attitudes towards properties at the same time, 
or nearly.  I believe I can show these things by using cases already in the literature that 
involve particulars, and that a privation theory can best account for them.  
Although, as I indicated, it’s difficult to get an unanswerable proof of the truth of a priva-
tion theory, I think its adoption can be motivated by normative and historical considera-
tions.  In Latin and Greek there is no distinctive word for moral badness, the same word 
applies to all sorts of badness.  Thus, to describe Plato and Augustine’s view as a privation 
theory of evil is somewhat misleading, even if traditional.  To them, every bad thing was a 
privation, including, presumably, all sorts of normative deficiencies.  This would include 
irrationality, immorality, and, in their metaphysics, unreality.  Normativity seems deeply 
involved in language, both from a pre-philosophical, and from a philosophical, standpoint. 
It’s common to speak of good and bad grammar, good and bad word usage, and good and 
bad style.  Truthfulness is good, and untruthfulness is bad.  Some words are considered 
worse than others.  Within philosophy, the view that meaning is normative is associated 
with Kripke (1982, 22-4).  It is influential, even if contested.  But normative considera-
tions come up in other ways, clearly, if sometimes only implicitly.  Davidson’s Principle of 
Charity (1973, 326) can be considered normative.  Grice’s Conversational Maxims (1989, 
26-27) are best understood as rules we ought to follow.  Ordinary Language Philosophers 
and their opponents sharply disagreed about the nature of language, but each seems to have 
been quite convinced that there were right and wrong ways to use it.  Indeed, that seems 
to be at the center of their disagreement.  The former thought that the right way was the 
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informal usage of ordinary men, and the latter thought it was the formal usage of logicians. 
And each side, whatever its official view of value judgments, was out to make philosophy 
and the world better.  
Very plausibly, some of the notions of good and bad mentioned in the last paragraph aren’t 
purely linguistic.  That’s all right.  All I’m maintaining is that there are normative consid-
erations involved, at least some of which take distinctive forms when applied to language, 
and that the relevant violations of the relevant norms can be accommodated in a privation 
theory of the sort that’s often applied to moral evil.  I think that’s plausible, and I think 
that’s all I need.  In fact, the weakness of my thesis may actually increase its fruitfulness. 
It could allow it to be applied, with some prima facie plausibility, to virtually any use of 
language which appears wrong in some way.  
This will also serve to motivate and justify acceptance of the new explanations of known 
linguistic phenomena in terms of the de dicto/de re distinction that I intend to offer soon. 
Any deficiency in the actual use of language which involves reference is a candidate to be 
accounted for in terms of said distinction on a privation view of the de dicto, because a 
de dicto use is just one which is relevantly deficient.  What’s more, such looseness in the 
account will be highly desirable, if not absolutely necessary, when we turn to predicates in 
Section III.  As I said in Section I, many of the most interesting applications pertain to nor-
mative properties, such as goodness and rationality.  It’s almost a truism that it’s morally 
desirable to understand morality, and rationally desirable to understand rationality.  Given 
privation theories of evil and irrationality, the privative status of misuses of the words that 
apply to them follows almost trivially.  The privation view of evil is, I believe, traditional 
and common; the privation view of irrationality, as far as I know, is neither, though that 
may just be because few philosophers have thought about the ontological status of irration-
ality.  But, if the privative nature of evil can be used to explain certain puzzles regarding its 
cognition, and parallel problems involving unreason could be addressed in the same way, 
that by itself would provide a reason to adopt a privation theory of irrationality.  
There is one possible objection to the line of reasoning in the previous paragraph that 
needs addressing.  One may think that, if evil and unreason are mere privations, that would 
present insuperable obstacles to having even de dicto attitudes towards them.  How could 
you have attitudes towards something that isn’t really there?  There are doubtless deep and 
difficult problems here, but it’s a historical fact that it is possible to have attitudes towards 
things that don’t, and even can’t, exist as long as one believes they do exist.  Many math-
ematicians through the centuries wanted a method for squaring the circle with compass and 
straight edge, for example, before it was finally proven that there could be no such method. 
All this may seem just too easy to some, but I ask the reader to wait and see what work this 
way of approaching thought and language can do before rejecting it out of hand.  Now I’d 
like to examine some cases in the literature in light of the preceding remarks.  
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Consider the following case, which I adapt from one given by Keith Donnellan (1970, 
349-51).  Suppose a philosophy student has long wanted to meet the famous philosopher 
H.P. Aston-Martin.  At a party, he is introduced to someone under that name.  Unbeknownst 
to him, a trick is being played on him, and the man is actually someone obscure named 
V.W. Bugg.  Under a misapprehension as to their identity, he refers to them variously in 
his later accounts.  “I met H.P. Aston-Martin the other day” (de dicto, Aston-Martin, de re, 
Bugg.)  “I’ve always wanted to meet Aston-Martin” (de re, Aston-Martin.)  “Aston-Martin 
is a good dancer” (de dicto, Aston-Martin, de re, Bugg.)  “Aston-Martin rejected some of 
his earlier positions” (first reference, de dicto, Aston Martin, de re, Bugg; second refer-
ence, de re, Aston Martin.)  “Aston-Martin seemed full of hope for the future” (de dicto, 
Aston-Martin, de re, Bugg.)  ”I believe Aston-Martin’s best work is ahead of him” (both 
references, de re, Aston-Martin.)  It is entirely possible (and plausible) that he could say all 
these sentences in the space of a single, short, conversation, referring indifferently to one 
and then the other, without ever realizing it.  There are a few features of note in this exam-
ple.  First, the student succeeds in referring de re to Bugg, even though he doesn’t know his 
name, and, in a sense, doesn’t know who he is.  Likewise, we may suppose that someone 
sufficiently confused about the nature of goodness or rationality might nonetheless be able 
to think about it and desire it de re, even if he didn’t know that was what he was doing, by 
coming across an instance of it, and mistaking it for something else.  Second, the fact that 
he uses Aston-Martin’s name, and knows enough about him to speak of him de re in normal 
circumstances, doesn’t guarantee that he’s speaking of him de re under these conditions 
of misidentification.  The sudden acquisition and great salience of new beliefs in this case 
would serve to make many beliefs presumably about him de dicto, even though, before he 
acquired these new beliefs, and, in many circumstances after he did, his old beliefs enabled 
him unproblematically to think about him de re.  Likewise, someone who confused evil or 
irrationality with something better, though still able to hold some attitudes towards it de 
re, might be able to desire it de dicto without thereby desiring it de re, and that by desir-
ing the thing he confused it with de re.  And, he might never realize he was not thinking 
only of irrationality or evil.  Also, I’d like to point out, the case is not much different if we 
suppose that the student believes that V.W. Bugg does not exist (perhaps he finds the name 
suspicious.)  He’d still be thinking about him de re.  Likewise, someone so confused as to 
believe that some real property (or even all properties) didn’t exist could still have attitudes 
towards it (or them) de re if he had interacted with it (or them) in the right way.  
I’d like to point out another way one can be confused about properties that’s the reverse of 
the last one, by thinking that one property is really more than one.  Again, the parallel prob-
lem for particulars is written about in the literature.  It’s sometimes called Frege’s Puzzle,1 
because Gottlob Frege (85) first posed it.  It’s classically posed as a problem involving the 
Evening Star (called Hesperus) and the Morning Star (called Phosphorus.)  It’s trivial to be 
told ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’, but it’s not trivial to be told ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, even 
though the two names name the same thing.  The latter was an important discovery of an-
cient astronomy.  If one does not believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus, it must be because 
he, however temporarily, is ignorant about what at least one of the names refers to.  This 
1    Van Roojen (ff.) thought of applying the lessons of Frege’s Puzzle to Moral Psychology in his paper of 2010.  His use was 
limited to arguing that the properties of goodness and being practically rational could be identical without its being obvious, and 
he didn’t discuss the de re/de dicto distinction.  My own views were arrived at independently.
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sort of ignorance, again, can appear and disappear very quickly and very unpredictably. 
In this case, as in cases of ordinary misinformation, the addition of a new belief to one’s 
store, can cause him to have de dicto attitudes, without necessarily rendering de re cogni-
tion impossible for him.  An ancient Babylonian could believe, perfectly rationally by his 
lights, “Hesperus appears in the evening but Phosphorus doesn’t, and Phosphorus appears 
in the morning but Hesperus doesn’t.”  In one sentence, the first ‘Hesperus’ is de re, the first 
‘Phosphorus’ de dicto, the second ‘Phosphorus’ de re, and the second ‘Hesperus’ de dicto, 
and all without the believer’s having any clue about it.  (I consider the first ‘Phosphorus’ 
and the second ‘Hesperus’ to be de dicto because the clauses they are in are both false and 
rational.  If you reach a false belief about something perfectly rationally, it’s because you 
lack knowledge you should have, and that’s a privation.)  It seems reasonable that, if one 
doesn’t believe rationality or morality are of a single kind, or one draws an unwarranted 
distinction between the properties of one’s common sense beliefs and their philosophi-
cal namesakes, he could go from understanding what they are to not and back again very 
quickly, without recognizing it.  Examples might be a Marxist who distinguishes between 
Bourgeois and Revolutionary Morality, and, in virtue of that distinction, feels justified in 
ignoring most moral obligations, Averroes, who distinguished between Religious Truth 
and Philosophical Truth, and held they could disagree, or Berkeley, who held there was a 
distinction between the pre-philosophical notion of a physical object and his philosophi-
cal notion, and that the former should be rejected.  It’s not too hard to see how such false 
distinctions could arise, either.  In each case, the thinker finds something he likes in the 
property and something he doesn’t, and, rather than accept it as a package deal, comes to 
believe that his difference in attitudes corresponds to a difference in their objects.  If you 
accept, as many do, that there’s a connection between liking something and thinking that 
it’s good in some way, and disliking something, and thinking it’s bad in some way, then 
false distinctions regarding normative properties becomes even more understandable.  
So far I’ve just discussed confusions based on mistaken identities.  It’s not entirely clear 
whether one can go from understanding to not understanding a term so easily because of 
other false beliefs.  It should be noted however that, while considerations based on Rus-
sell’s Paradox show that not all descriptions define properties, it still seems likely that 
many of them do, so cases of falsely describing properties should often collapse into cases 
of false identification of properties.  This suggests that highly volatile states of confusion 
about properties might occur more readily than similar states about objects.  
Finally, I want to disclaim any intention of completeness in my brief account of ways our 
attitudes may be de dicto.  I’m sure there’s more that can be said.  But this should give 
enough of an idea of their variety and volatility to serve our purpose.  
3.
The phenomenon of not grasping the reference of a predicate properly seems very real to 
me, and, I hope, to you, and my explanation of it, in terms of the de dicto/de re distinction, 
seems very intuitive to me, and, I hope, to you, but it would scarcely be worth making, 
if it didn’t have applications to other areas of philosophy.  As it is, it has applications to 
Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Moore Stud-
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ies, Metaphilosophy, Metaethics, and Philosophy of Science, some of them potentially 
very important.  I’ll discuss most of them, some better and some worse, in this section.  
First, the intuitiveness and fecundity of such a distinction is additional reason for taking 
seriously the claims of Second Order Logic, as I suggested before.  The distinction between 
the logical form of de re attitude reports and the logical form of de dicto attitude reports 
is partly a matter of whether we quantify over the right variables (de re) or not (de dicto). 
So, if we can think de re about the referents of predicates, we must be able to quantify over 
variables in predicate place, for which we need Second (or Higher) Order Logic.  Since 
quantification over something commits us to its existence, the acceptance of this distinc-
tion commits us to the existence of things that predicates refer to, whatever they are.  Many 
philosophers think they are sets, but the distinction between de re and de dicto attitudes to 
them in propositional attitude reports militates for a different view of Second Order Logic, 
as quantifying over finely grained properties instead.  There are two reasons for saying this. 
First, it seems that, as a matter of simple logical form, one could distinguish between de re 
attitudes towards the things that have a property, and de re attitudes towards the property. 
The former would involve giving the object quantifiers the widest scope, the propositional 
attitude operator intermediate scope, and the property quantifier the narrowest scope.  The 
latter would involve giving the property quantifier the widest scope, the propositional at-
titude operator intermediate scope, and the object quantifier the narrowest scope.   This 
distinction in logical form should mark a distinction in how people can think, or why do 
we have propositional attitude operators?  Second, it seems intuitive that someone could 
have a perfectly adequate way of finding objects that satisfied a given predicate, and still 
not know what the predicate referred to.  Consider the color-blind man with a spectrometer 
which clicked whenever it was pointed at something red.  He could be able to identify red 
things as well as was needed, without knowing what red was, so there must be something 
more to redness than the set of things that have it.  Or consider a foreigner who has memo-
rized the names and brief biographies of all the Vice-Presidents of the United States, but 
doesn’t know anything about the powers, privileges, and responsibilities of the office.  He 
would seem to have a grasp on the extension of ‘is Vice-President of the United States,’ but 
not on the property of being Vice-President of the United States.  
The example of the color-blind man with the spectrometer might suggest Jackson’s case 
of Mary (1982, 130) the brilliant color scientist with black-and-white vision, who knew 
everything about the color red except what it looked like.  I believe the former could be 
elaborated into the latter.  If it were, Mary’s ignorance of what red looked like would make 
some of her knowledge of it de dicto.  On my view, that is perfectly compatible with the 
rest of it being de re.  (In fact, I believe some of it would be.)  Since Jackson wants to argue 
that Mary doesn’t just occasionally lack knowledge of red, or of some physical fact about 
redness, but specifically that she lacks knowledge of the mentalistic fact of how red looks, 
my approach would tend to be at odds with his, but it would be difficult for me to say any-
thing more definite than that without further investigation.  
I have claimed that we quantify over properties which leads to the question of what they 
are.  I don’t think the logic decides among the different views, and I’m not going to press 
a particular view where the logic doesn’t.  We quantify over them, so we’re committed 
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to their existence by Quine’s famous criterion of ontological commitment (1948, 31-32). 
I think we’re committed to some of them, at least, being irreducible to objects or sets. 
They must somehow be accessible to the mind.  Apart from these strictures, you’re free 
to choose among all the opinions that have been mooted over the millennia.  They might 
be Platonic ante rem universals, which exist independently of the objects that instantiate 
them, and would exist even if nothing instantiated them.  They might be Aristotelian in 
rebus universals that exist only in the things that instantiate them, and only insofar as they 
are instantiated.  They might be ideas in the mind of God.  They might be equivalence 
classes of tropes, to mention a contemporary view.  I’m sure a vigorous debate over their 
nature and status and accessibility could take place, after all, it has for thousands of years, 
but I intend simply to sit it out.  And, if you find the idea of properties, or our having them 
in mind, too hard to swallow, I shall not try to counter your objections directly.  I am not 
trying to present conclusive proofs of the views I promote in this paper; I have the more 
modest ambition of merely proposing some new considerations in their favor, and dealing 
with a few of the historical objections to them.  
The distinction between de dicto and de re attitudes towards properties might be used to 
help clear up some problems for common views in Moral Psychology.  It is commonly and 
traditionally held that all desire is for the good, that is, we only desire things insofar as they 
seem, or are, good, in whatever way.  Although it’s not my intention to explicate this view 
more than is necessary, so as not to have to decide between competing schemes of refine-
ment, I think it is necessary to make some things clear, in order to avoid seeming to endorse 
some particular over refinement. Though we may bring considerable philosophical bag-
gage to our understanding of this thesis, it would clearly be wrong to pass all this baggage 
on to the people whose minds we hope to describe.  To take a simple example, we certainly 
would not want to have to ascribe any sophisticated and contentious philosophical views 
about the nature of the good to everyone who prefers good pizza to bad pizza.  We should 
ascribe the minimum philosophical commitments consistent with our thesis to such a man, 
which I take to be that he’s aware (if only implicitly) of the goodness of the pizza, in some 
way to be made clear later, and that this awareness plays the proper motivational role in 
his desiring the good pizza, also in some way to be made clear later. (By way of analogy, 
remember the case of the man thinking de re about V.W. Bugg, even though he has no de 
dicto knowledge of him.)   I do not want to claim that he really only desires the property of 
goodness (it’s hard to see what this could even mean,) or that he desires the pizza only as a 
means to acquire its goodness.  But the fact that it’s good must play an explanatory role in 
the account of his motivation.  
At any rate, this view of motivation runs into trouble in that there seem to be actual cases 
of people desiring things which they think are not good, or not desiring things which they 
think are good.  One class of such cases is cases of weakness of the will.  One can, for ex-
ample, be aware that sticking to one’s diet is necessary to avoid diabetes, and that avoiding 
diabetes is better than eating what one wants, and still opt for the second slice of chocolate 
cake, because it just looks so luscious in the moment.  In this case, even though he’s aware, 
in whatever sense, that not eating is better, he eats, which is both possible and problematic. 
It can be explained by supposing that such a man, perhaps temporarily, does not fully grasp 
what it is for one thing to be better than another as he judges that sticking to his diet would 
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be better, and his attitude towards its betterness is de dicto, exactly when and how it would 
count.  The last clause is important.  It is not inconsistent with my view that the man might 
have de re attitudes towards the betterness of sticking to his diet at approximately the same 
time.   Just as the Babylonian I mentioned in the last section can think about Hesperus de 
re at one spot in a sentence, but can only think of it de dicto in another, so, I believe, the 
prospective diabetic can be thinking of goodness de dicto in ways related to motivation, but 
de re in ways that lead to remorse.  Thus, we can not only account for the phenomenon of 
giving into temptation, but the experience of hating oneself while doing so.  I think some 
plausibility can be given to this account when we remember that the intensity of some 
mental states can cause other of our mental states to become defective.  Thus, just as the 
awareness of how one’s head is throbbing in the morning can impair one’s full apprecia-
tion of how appealing the tenth margarita appeared the night before, and is likely to appear 
again, so the present lusciousness of the chocolate cake can lead to defects in one’s grasp 
of its future bad effects.  The solution in either case is just to cognize better, to get oneself 
to the point where one grasps all the relevant factors fully in the same judgment.  
The other class of putative counterexamples to the claim that people desire goodness and 
don’t desire evil has to do with perversity, that is, seeking what’s bad because it’s bad.  To 
explain, there are people, Satanists and the like, who will explicitly and deliberately assert 
that they want to be evil and don’t want to be good, and, when given the option, actually 
seem to choose doing the wrong thing over doing the right.  The general outline of a re-
sponse should be clear to you by now, it is to say that they love evil and hate good only 
because and insofar as their attitudes towards them are de dicto.  If they fully and continu-
ously grasped the nature of the properties they were thinking about, if their attitudes were 
fully and consistently de re, they’d always love good and hate evil.  Note that, as I indicated 
with regard to redness, not knowing what these properties are is compatible with being able 
to identify their instances in many cases.  Note also, that there’s nothing in this account 
that would preclude Satanists from desiring good and hating evil de re, they’d just have to 
do it in unobvious ways. Finally, to those who find it incredible that cognition could go so 
horribly wrong, I say, first, wrongness is exactly what my theory predicts, and, second, it’s 
hard to see how Satanists could not be horribly wrong in some way. 
Another sort of perversity, with regard to cognition, can perhaps be dealt with in a similar 
manner.  Analytic Philosophers seem inclined to regard all men as rational, in a sufficiently 
loose sense, even if they don’t explicitly say so, and the common view among Epistemolo-
gists is that beliefs tend to be better to the extent they are rational.  Yet there seem to be 
people who explicitly and deliberately deny their own rationality, and claim beliefs are 
only commendable when adopted contrary to reason.  Kierkegaard, for one, claimed, as I 
understand, that belief was only meritorious, if, and insofar as, it was irrational, and salva-
tion was a matter of what he called a leap of faith, in which one adhered to God, not merely 
in spite of, but because of, a lack of reason to do so.  I suggest this is only because he didn’t 
fully and consistently understand rationality, or irrationality.  If his attitudes towards them 
had been continuously de re, rather than occasionally de dicto, he would never have been 
able to maintain them.  Once again, this doesn’t mean that he wouldn’t have been able to 
identify rational and irrational beliefs in many cases.  This claim (that irrationalists do not 
cognize their position properly) is probably somewhat more intuitive than the previous 
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claim about immoralists, because it is more intuitive that rationality is necessary to proper 
cognition.  
In my accounts of the above kinds of cases of the flouting of morals and reason, I maintain 
that one can only flout them if one doesn’t, at the moment of flouting, grasp them in the 
right way, that is, if one’s attitudes towards them are relevantly de dicto.  Furthermore, to 
make my accounts work, I have to suppose that, in such cases, one sees, however mis-
takenly, something right in flouting them.  That is, one must think that there’s something 
good in badness, or something rational in irrationality, where one’s attitudes towards that 
goodness or rationality is de re, though one’s attitudes towards the badness or irrationality 
that supposedly instantiates them is de dicto.  This is a complicated picture, but I think the 
complications are necessary, at least if we want to continue to adhere to something like 
the old views about what’s desirable and what isn’t.  If we say that Satanists desire evil 
de re, because they think there’s something good about it, then we say that it’s possible to 
desire evil both de re and  de dicto, since Satanists do both, but, then, it seems that there’s 
no way in which it’s impossible to desire evil.  This is a possible position, but it’s not the 
one we started with, and it’s not the consensus one.  It might also be urged against it that 
it’s very like, if not identical to, the view that there’s something good about evil, and this 
sounds incoherent, if one has the common understanding of good and evil.  It’s an egre-
giously wrong view, and, on my account, egregiously wrong attitudes are to be accounted 
for by supposing a de dicto reading of the attitudes.  On the opposite extreme, although it 
is theoretically possible for someone to use the word ‘evil’ to mean ‘good’, I don’t think 
it’s either necessary or plausible to hold that the Satanists are really thinking of goodness 
de re when they speak of evil, and just have very odd views about it.  On the view I take 
myself to be defending, people can aim for the good without having any particular commit-
ment to any strong metaphysical notion of it, by aiming for particular things that had some 
good property.  (For example, someone can want to be a good date without ever thinking 
of the metaphysics of goodness at all.)  So, Satanists don’t have to mean good by “evil” to 
be aiming for some good while pursuing what they call “evil”. Also, if this last proposal is 
true, the beliefs about the nature of goodness Satanists have would have to be so odd, that, 
again, it’s hard to see how they would all really be de re beliefs about goodness.  To fit the 
data, Satanists would have to believe of most actually evil deeds that they were good.  I 
have written of how one might have a de re attitude towards an extension, while having 
a de dicto attitude towards the associated property, but this case, in which one had a de re 
attitude towards a property, while consistently getting its extension exactly wrong, seems 
more dubious.  If someone said he knew what redness was, but consistently applied the 
word ‘red’ to all and only things that weren’t red, he would not be believed.  
Another difficult class of cases is that of self-deception.   There is much dispute about 
the proper characterization of this phenomenon, and even its existence, but, if you accept 
a naïve view of the notion, you are presented with two problems.  First, if you deceive 
someone that p, you must believe that ‘p’ is false, and, if you are deceived that p, you must 
believe that ’p’ is true, according to the meaning of the word ‘deceive’.  So, if you deceive 
yourself that p, you must believe that ‘p’ is true and believe that ‘p’ is false, which are con-
tradictories.  (This is called the ‘static paradox’.)  Second, deception is an intentional act, 
perpetrated by someone who knows the intention (the deceiver,) on someone who doesn’t 
Daniel Krasner | De Dicto and De Re Attitudes Towards Properties
29
(the deceived.)  If one person is both deceiver and deceived, he would seem to have to 
be both knowing and unknowing about his intent to deceive himself, and this is impos-
sible.  (This is called the ‘dynamic paradox’.  I get the foregoing from DeWeese-Boyd.) 
Our basic strategy should not be hard to foresee, but the details of the cases invite some 
refinements.  You can believe that ‘p’ is true and believe that ‘p’ is false at the same time 
if at least one of ‘true’ and ‘false’ is de dicto at that time.  The dynamic paradox is harder 
to be definite about, if only because we’re confronted with an embarrassment of riches. 
Consider, first, that knowledge of the intent to deceive involves nested propositional at-
titude operators, and second, that deception is supposed to take place over time.  The first 
consideration allows for multiple scope ambiguities beyond those we commonly call de 
dicto and de re, and, since these attitudes are supposed to be ones which the deceiver and 
the deceived have towards each other, and, those are the same person, our operators and the 
scope ambiguities they allow could iterate arbitrarily many times, making for a dizzying 
variety of ways one can misunderstand the content and nature of one’s own thoughts.  The 
second allows for the possibility that attitudes may go from de re to de dicto or vice versa as 
part of the process of self-deception.  This multitude of avenues for confusion is too large 
for us to consider in a paper mostly dealing with other topics, but the capacity for ever more 
intricate accounts it demonstrates suggests that it’s likely that some can be found that will 
satisfy all important desiderata.  
To continue the discussion, the distinction between de dicto and de re attitudes towards 
properties may be useful in understanding how philosophers can maintain positions that 
are clearly contrary to common sense.  It was perhaps first pointed out by G.E. Moore that 
many philosophers hold to positions that they must know are wrong.  Zeno of Elea, for in-
stance, believed that motion was impossible, yet he moved about Southern Italy from place 
to place quite competently, arguing in each place that motion was impossible.  If he truly 
hadn’t known how to move, and thereby known it was possible, he wouldn’t have been 
able to get out of bed in the morning.  The shape of an answer should be familiar by now: 
on those occasions when he planned and executed his own motions, his attitudes towards 
its impossibility were de dicto.  
As for how these people might have gotten so confused, knowing the psychology of peo-
ple whom one has never met, or hypothetical people, always presents challenges, but I 
think guesses can be made that are sufficiently plausible as to give some support to our 
explanations.  The Satanist might have heard as a child that sensual pleasure was evil, and 
abstention from it good, and, having strong sensual appetites and a low tolerance for frus-
tration, decided that those were identity statements, and, so, he should be evil.  Kierkegaard 
might have, and, according to some people, did, take Hegelianism to be the paradigm of 
rationality, and, finding it lacked appreciation for the tragic dimensions of life, and read 
an implausible purposiveness into every minute workaday detail, rejected what he took to 
be rationality for what he took to be its opposite. The self-deceiver might have developed 
his cognitive failings because he liked the immediate results.  Zeno might have decided 
that motion was impossible on the authority of his teacher Parmenides, but failed to draw 
the obvious conclusion about his own particular motions, out of an excess of reverence 
for that same teacher.  Instead of concluding that something was wrong with Parmenides’ 
arguments, even if he couldn’t say what, he concluded something was wrong with his 
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daily thoughts, even if he couldn’t say what.  None of these explanations are particularly 
far-fetched.  
Finally, there are arguments against Moral and Scientific Realism (and perhaps other kinds 
of realism) that may be affected by this distinction.  It is sometimes said, for example, that 
the different views of right and wrong are so various, and have so little in common, that 
they can’t determine the same properties, and we have no reason to regard the properties 
we refer to as being any more truly moral than any of the others.  Likewise, it’s claimed 
that when one scientific theory is supplanted by another, the beliefs about their theoretical 
objects are typically so different that the latter can’t be viewed as talking about the same 
things as the former, and the former’s theoretical objects must be viewed as non-existent. 
Since it seems reasonable that there will someday be new scientific theories supplanting 
the ones we have now, it seems reasonable to doubt the reality of our currently employed 
theoretical objects.  It should be clear by now that conflating two properties that are dis-
tinguished later is compatible with referring to both at different times, and falsely distin-
guishing two properties that are rightly identical needn’t keep one from referring to it.  And 
if different people conflate the same property with different properties, they can seem to 
disagree greatly, without really disagreeing much about the same thing.  For example, if 
one man conflates rightness with maximizing happiness and another conflates it with being 
decreed by God in the Bible (assume for the sake of the example that these are all distinct 
properties) they can say very different things about it de dicto, even while largely agree-
ing about it de re, and the real state of affairs might not be at all obvious to them or any 
observer.  As for scientific theory, the presence of some false details in one’s understanding 
of a theoretical concept doesn’t keep the relevant predicate from having it as its semantic 
referent, and, even in cases in which the concept is so confused that it seems impossible for 
a term to have a semantic referent, as in the case of Newtonian mass, which seems to be a 
conflation of rest mass and relativistic mass, that doesn’t mean that, as used on a specific 
occasion, it doesn’t have a particular speaker’s referent (Kripke 1977, fl.).  (Words without 
semantic referents can still have speaker’s referents.  Consider the expression ‘whatsit-
sname’.)  One can speak and think of real things de re, even without knowing quite what 
or how.   Disagreement may undermine realist arguments based on consensus, and may 
motivate skepticism, but it is, at most, only very weak evidence that there isn’t a matter of 
fact people disagree about.  
The answers I give or suggest to the above puzzles are not always perfectly respectful to 
the terms in which they are posed; with regard to many of them, they are revisionist about 
the views I seek to defend.  It is part and parcel of my views that it is possible to be averse 
to good, and desire evil, and to be averse to reason, and to desire unreason, if only in a 
sense.  De dicto attitudes are attitudes, and one is committed to the meanings of the sen-
tences he endorses.  That much of a concession to the immoralist and the irrationalist seems 
inevitable, however, given the data.  Explanations of all these things in terms of normative 
privations, respect the data, while preserving important normative intuitions.  As for how 
we can detect and remedy such privations, while perfection is certainly unattainable, we 
may hope, nonetheless, that, as we improve our cognitions as we ought to, the worst of 
them can be expunged over time.    
Daniel Krasner | De Dicto and De Re Attitudes Towards Properties
31
REFERENCES
Burge, T. 1979. Individualism and the Mental.  Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73-121.  
Davidson, D. 1967.  Truth and Meaning.  Synthese 17: 304-323.  
Davidson, D. 1973.  Radical Interpretation.  Dialectica, 27: 314–328.
DeWeese-Boyd, I. 2010. Self-Deception. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed-
ited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed August 18, 2012.  http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/self-deception/.  
Donnellan, K. S. 1970. Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions.  Synthese 21: 335-
358.  
Donnellan, K. S. 1966. Reference and Definite Descriptions.  Philosophical Review 75: 
281-304
Frege, G. 1949. On Sense and Nominatum.  Translator Herbert Feigl.  In Readings in 
Philosophical Analysis, ed. F. Herbert and W. Sellars, 85-102.  New York: Ap-
pleton-Century-Crofts.   
Grice, H.P. 1975. Logic and Conversation. Syntax and Semantics, vol.3 edited by P. Cole 
and J. Morgan, Academic Press. Reprinted as ch.2 of Grice 1989, 22–40.  
Jackson, F. 1982. Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–136.  
Kripke, S. 1977. Semantic Reference and Speaker’s Reference.  In Contemporary Per-
spectives in the Philosophy of Language, ed. P. A. French, T. E. Uehling and H. 
K. Wettstein, 6-27.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
Kripke, S. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.  Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Quine, W. van O. 1948. On What There Is.  The Review of Metaphysics 2 (5): 21-38.  
Tarski, A. 1944. The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics.  
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4: 341-375.  
Van Roojen, M.  2010. Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism.  Ethics 120: 495-525.  
________________________________________________________________________
Received: August 18, 2012 
Accepted: February 4, 2014
Metropolitan State University of Denver
Department of Philosophy




EuJAP | Vol. 9 | No. 2 | 2013
32
